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**Ordering Eurasia:**

**Russia’s Approach to Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Post-Soviet Space**

On April 2016, the UN Security Council Resolution 2282 adopted the term “sustaining peace” to denote the global mission of stemming the tide of symmetric and asymmetric conflicts, transnational crime, and international terrorism. While the resolution called for a closer cooperation among all member states, the prevailing global architecture and academic research on conflict and peacebuilding has primarily been driven by the discourses and practices of Western states. As a result, there is a critical knowledge gap on how emerging and non-Western powers such as Russia understand, practice, and approach to the endeavours of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Capturing Russian views on peace and conflict is important because it structures and shapes policy and academic discourses with regards to how the nature of conflict is understood, how the solution to (both symmetrical and asymmetrical) conflicts is devised, and how the coordination with a diverse array of state and non-state actors is envisaged. In the conventional Russian perspective on conflictology, domestic political conflict is largely understood as a symptom of weak state authority. As such, the state (*gosudarstvo*) lies at the heart of the Russian perspective on peace. At the most fundamental level, the state is not only the guardian of peace and stability but also the guarantor of human rights. The consolidation of the state, accompanied by its authority (*avtoritet*) and stability (*stabilnost’*), transforms this pathetic violence-prone *homo sapiences* into decent “human citizens”, and in doing so, the state authority *generates* human rights and endow them within its citizens. In this worldview of statism (*gosudarstvennichestvo*), the state is not only the chief provider of public goods but more importantly the creator of human morality. This view is most clearly expressed by Vladimir Putin’s famous remark: “The stronger the state, the freer the individual.” This deeply-held belief forms the backbone of the Russian approach to peacebuilding. Among Russian elites, peacebuilding (*mirostroitelstvo* or sometimes referred to as *mirostroyeniye*) essentially constitutes peace enforcement – that of empowering the central state authority and rooting out forces for instability. In this approach, participatory governance, political decentralization, and civil society involvement are not a top-priority. While this statist approach to peacebuilding stands at contradiction to the liberal peace paradigm advanced by the Western powers, the Russian model already functions as a *de facto* template for peace-related activities in much part of the post-Soviet space, especially in Central Asia. The Russian and post-Soviet elites largely shares the statist understanding of peace, where *mirostroitelstvo* is not just as an approach to conflict resolution and ‘peacebuilding’ but as a regionalized discourse of state elites representing certain norms about the nature of conflict resolution.